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Introduction 
Performance Based Service Acquisition is a Department of Defense (DoD) 
acquisition reform that has had noted success in reducing cost and streamlining the 
management of non-core government service capabilities (Office of the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense – Defense Acquisition Reform [OSD-DAR], 2000).  The guiding 
principle in Performance Based Service Acquisition is that when an outside vendor 
exists who can perform a service more effectively than a government user could 
organically, that user should specify measurable outcomes to a service vendor, and 
allow the vendor to best determine the appropriate processes (how) of delivering the 
service. In adopting this reform, DoD has been influenced by the perceived success of 
outsourcing in the private sector.  Firms have witnessed gains from devolving non-core 
activities to suppliers, while achieving high levels of transparency so that visibility of 
inventory and information is maintained throughout the supply chain (Spekman & Davis, 
2004).  
Performance Based Logistics (PBL) is an extension of Performance Based 
Service Acquisition aimed at the logistic services for major weapon systems.  The 
Quadrennial Defense Review mandated DoD to implement PBL, in order to “compress 
the supply chain and improve readiness for major weapons systems and commodities.” 
(Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2001: 56)   PBL is intended to reduce lifecycle cost, 
increase readiness, improve reliability and reduce the logistical footprint of weapon 
systems.  A number of case studies of successful PBL initiatives are available (e.g., 
Candreva, et al., 2001). 
This paper takes for granted the ubiquitous nature of PBL initiatives, and takes 
as its starting point the question of how best to measure the degree of their success.  In 
support of our prescriptions for measurement, we will draw not only on successful best 
practice, but also on the underlying logic and justification of outsourcing, as laid out in 
the economics and management literature.  While PBL prescriptions from OSD are 
always careful to explain that a PBL initiative may result in the selection of an ‘organic 
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contractor’ (i.e., another DoD command), actual instances of ‘organic contractors’ are 
fairly rare, and in any event, some of the same measurement issues arise regardless of 
the blend of private sector and organic resources. 
While measuring the performance of ongoing PBL initiatives is our starting point, 
we also intend this paper to inform valuation questions.  From the initial question of 
whether to bring forward a weapon system or a major component of a weapon system 
as a candidate for PBL, to later design questions of ‘what form’ of PBL is best applied to 
that candidate, measurement issues are endemic.  After all, the logistic services to be 
outsourced will be priced contractually, and for some services, there is no clear market 
to determine that price.  When discussing CONUS transportation, prices are perhaps 
not difficult to determine by reference to a market.  However, when discussing 
something like intermediate-level maintenance of a deployed weapon system on which 
the DoD has a monopsony and the number of qualified bidders is quite limited (and may 
indeed be only one or two), the market paradigm clearly breaks down, and is perhaps 
best understood in the context of game theory (Shubik & Levitan, 1980).  Unlike the 
simple solutions of monopolistic games, however, the monopsonistic game of buying 
weapon systems logistics is hampered by the difficulty of measuring the value of the 
services to be obtained. 
In discussing whether a case could be made for the privatization of a particular 
governmental service, Bendick (1984) said it was important to compare private to 
‘nonmarket’ (i.e., organic) alternatives, and that the private sector should only be 
employed if it could reasonably be expected to be more efficient. He listed  
 “four aspects of market efficiency [that] are important to examine: 
• In producing the services … do the private sector’s production processes 
and input costs allow it to generate output at a lower total cost than could 
the public sector? 
• Are the administrative costs incurred by government to mobilize and 
control the private sector les than the cost savings from more efficient 
production? 
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• Is the supply side of the market sufficiently responsive that private firms 
enter markets rapidly and smoothly? 
• Are purchasers sufficiently rational and careful, and the quality of the 
service sufficiently definable and measurable, that effective, informed 
consumer sovereignty can be exercised?  (Bendick, 1984, pp. 153-154).” 
Each of these considerations is potentially problematic when examining PBL 
initiatives.  When considering the first of the above factors, the existence of PBL 
contracts in which the private sector vendor has hired back organic resources as 
subcontractors to do the touch labor puts in question exactly what services are being 
outsourced – logistics or management?  When considering the third of his factors, the 
consolidation of the defense industry and the decline of the number of independent 
companies that might act as potential bidders raise concern.  However, this paper will 
primarily concern itself with the second, and especially the fourth of these factors.  We 
will discuss how an excess of measurement can make administration of comprehensive 
PBL contracts more costly, while the difficulty with defining and measuring some logistic 
services make consumer sovereignty difficult to establish. 
The rest of the paper will be organized as follows. First, we will lay out a 
structural framework upon which measurement issues will be developed.  Upon that 
framework, we will then develop questions about how measurement informs which sorts 
of candidates are best suited for PBL.  Finally, we will discuss how measurement issues 
should be considered when deciding on the form of PBL to be adopted for a particular 
candidate, and the management of ongoing PBL contracts.  We are not attempting to 
clearly delineate between good and bad measures, or good or bad candidates for PBL.  
Rather, we are attempting to surface imbedded measurement-related issues that may 
make the difference between a problematic implementation and an easy one.  Thus, 
this paper is not intended as a guidebook for implementation, but rather as a guidebook 
for further investigation. 
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A Hierarchical Bridge Framework of Measurement 
for PBL 
When describing logistics service acquisition for a weapon system as an 
economic game, it is important at the outset to note the dissimilarity between the two 
players.  The vendor has a clear objective of maximizing the wealth of its owners, and a 
clear profit incentive (again, we assume throughout the paper that we are dealing with a 
private-sector vendor).  The objective of the user acquiring the service is not so easy to 
state, and far more difficult to assess.  Ambiguities in goals and a lack of linkage 
between services acquisition goals and strategic objectives are intrinsic aspects of the 
services acquisition process (Camm et al, 2004; Ausink et al 2002).  Maximizing 
national security would be one way to state the objective, and the incentive (at least at 
the organizational level) might be understood in the same terms – to gain more security 
for the nation.   At the outset then, the game has a measurement and a translation 
problem – measuring the services in terms of their contribution to the objectives and 
incentives of the DoD, and translating that measure into the dollar measurement used 
by the private sector. 
Of course, it might be claimed that business does not really have such clear 
objectives and incentives either.  There is a venerable literature pointing out the 
maximization of shareholder wealth should not be (and is not in practice) the sole aim of 
a public corporation.  Stakeholder analysis has its roots in this observation (Donaldson 
& Preston, 1995).  But even stakeholder analysis (in narrow form at least) does not 
deny the centrality of profit as a corporate incentive, rather the discussion centers on 
rights of resource holders, and equitable distribution of profits.   
The management fashion of Balanced Scorecards has demonstrated the 
willingness of corporate executives to look beyond profit in analyzing performance 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1992).  But it would be a mistake to take the current proliferation of 
Balanced Scorecards as evidence that corporations suffer under the same sorts of 
fundamental measurement problems with their objectives and incentives as the DoD.  
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The Balanced Scorecard is clearly meant to be a diagnostic tool to inform management 
decisions beyond retrospective financial figures about the long term viability of the firm 
(i.e., it is meant in part to help predict and control future financial performance).  Kaplan 
and Norton (1992) discuss the shortcomings of financial performance measures in 
terms of their ability to guide (1) the innovation necessary to obtain future profitability, 
(2) the diagnosis of internal process problems that limit current and future profitability 
and (3) the relationship with the customer necessary to sustain future profitability.  Their 
main criticisms of current financial measures (which are a part of the Balanced 
Scorecard) are that they are historical and external to operations.  They tell a firm how 
well it has performed, not why, or what to do next to maintain or improve future 
performance. 
But measurement-related differences between the DoD and the corporate world 
exist not only in the incentives and objectives of each, but also in the process 
capabilities that are important in developing logistics tactics to meet those objectives.  In 
reviewing essential dimensions to be considered in logistic performance analysis in the 
commercial sector, Mentzer & Konrad (1991) developed a matrix in which five core 
logistics functions (transportation, warehousing, inventory, order processing and 
administration) could be measured along six dimensions (cost, labor, facilities, 
equipment, time & energy).  Distinguish between those dimensions and the four 
“overarching goals of PBL … to compress the supply chain, eliminate non-value added 
steps, reduce Total Ownership Cost and improve readiness for weapons 
systems…(Department of Defense – Defense Contract Management Agency [DoD-
DCMA], undated)” to which one should add “increased reliability and reduced logistics 
footprint (Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD], 2003)”.  Aside from cost, these sets 
of six factors seem to have little in common.  But all of the commercial sector factors 
can be translated into cost, and can be understood as the essential dimensions that 
must be managed efficiently and effectively, in order to facilitate logistics support of the 
firm’s profitability objective.  The DoD factors, on the other hand, do not all translate so 
readily into cost, and fall into three categories of dimensions that logistics improves 
warfighting capability:  improved readiness (facilitated both directly by a focus on 
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readiness and indirectly by a focus on reliability), increased agility (reducing logistical 
footprint, eliminating non-value-added steps, supply chain compression, and improved 
reliability) and reducing cost (by freeing capital for other warfighting priorities).   
This is a significant difference in how logistics is viewed.  The concept of 
readiness shows up as ‘equipment’ to commercial firms, who view the maintenance and 
functioning (and depreciation) of their operating capital primarily as a financial question 
– when will it become so expensive to maintain that I will have to replace it? Since DoD 
weapon systems are often quite old, very expensive and difficult to re-capitalize (lacking 
a depreciation mechanism, recapitalization is often driven by technological 
obsolescence or budget constraints), readiness is a much more central issue. 
Improvements in readiness, of course, improve warfighting capability; but marginal 
improvements are quite difficult to value in dollar terms. The idea of ‘agility’ is 
increasingly important to commercial firms, but agility in a commercial operation means, 
for example, the flexibility to quickly change production volumes, or quickly changing 
production technology.  It shows up in the list above as ‘time’, which is also translatable 
to dollars.  DoD operations on the other hand are mobile, and mobility directly impacts 
their effectiveness.  Agility is not a newly discovered competitive dimension – it has 
always been an operational necessity.  Once again, however, the operational 
effectiveness derived from a marginal improvement in logistics agility is very difficult to 
translate into dollars.   
These differences in organizational objectives and the consequent logistics 
objectives further devolve into differences in process measurement.  Caplice & Sheffi 
(1994), in a classification and review of corporate logistic process metrics develop three 
categories: utilization, productivity, and effectiveness (see Table 1).  Utilization 
measures simply address the question of how much of a resource is used, compared to 
what has been made available.  While these sorts of measures may be useful in 
assessing the efficiency of a narrow segment of a process (e.g., space utilization may 
be useful in assessing the efficiency of a facilities layout manager), they have virtually 
no contribution to the understanding of logistics contribution to organizational objectives, 
primarily because they do not measure outputs at all.  It might be claimed that they 
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measure waste, but even this is not true – all they measure is activity, not whether that 
activity is directed toward some valued outcome.  What Caplice and Sheffi (1994) have 
called effectiveness measures, on the other hand, ‘beg the question’ in an essential way 
– those measures are only as good as the norms one establishes for outputs.  They 
may be useful for historical comparison of a single process, but their value in comparing 
across processes or in guiding resource allocation decisions is quite limited.  
Productivity measures, on the other hand, incorporate both outputs and inputs.  For the 
corporation, assessing the contribution of an activity to its objectives is a matter of 
relating those inputs outputs to profits.  While of course this is not necessarily easy 
(e.g., single factor productivity measures do not capture a comprehensive cost picture), 
at least the examples given by Caplice & Sheffi (1994) can be measured or translated to 
dollars (e.g., dollars paid for orders processed, or shipments made), and this is broadly 
true of metrics proposed in other reviews of corporate logistic performance 
measurement systems as well (e.g., Chow, Heaver & Henriksson, 1994; Lambert & 
Burduroglu, 2000; Mentzer & Konrad, 1991), with the important exception of customer 
satisfaction metrics.  The importance of the ‘customer view’ has already been 
mentioned in relation to Balanced Scorecards, is often mentioned by authors on logistic 
performance measurement (e.g., Mentzer, Flint and Kent, 1999).  However, it is worth 
noting that Lambert & Burduroglu (2000) list “reliance on management outside of 
logistics to identify the impact [of customer satisfaction] on revenues, which typically 
does not happen” as a primary disadvantage of customer satisfaction measurement.  
Hence, beyond simple utilization measures, corporate logistic performance measures 
can, or are desired to be, understood in terms of their impact on profitability. 
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Table 1.  Corporate Logistics Metrics (from Caplice and Sheffi, 1994) 
Dimension Form of Metric Logistics Examples 
Utilization Actual Input /  
Input Norm 
Labor hour used / labor hours budgeted 
Area of warehouse occupied / total area 
Hours machine used / machine capacity 
Productivity Actual Output / 
Actual Input 
Ton-miles delivered / costs incurred 
Orders processed / hours of labor 
Pallets unloaded / hour of dock time 
Effectiveness Actual Output /  
Output Norm 
Items filled / items requested 
Shipments on time / shipments sent 
Transactions w/o error / total transactions 
Compare those corporate logistic measures to what might be proposed as a 
productivity ratio for weapons systems logistics –  
Operational Availability (Ao) of deployed systems / Total deployed hours. 
At first glance, this looks like a utilization measure, not a productivity measure – 
but Ao is often used as a surrogate for readiness, which is typically given as a primary 
outcome objective of military logistics (it would be a utilization measure if, e.g., flight 
hours were in the numerator).  The denominator translates to dollars in a budget 
(whether or not they could be translated to an actual cost is another issue).  But the 
numerator is not and should not be translatable to dollars, because profit is not the 
objective.  While measurable, it is difficult to value in terms of the dollars that might be 
spent to increase it, or relinquished in order to pursue other priorities.  Another problem 
is that Ao is only a surrogate for readiness because it is a ‘single factor’ measure. It is 
also not fine grained enough for many resource allocation decision we wish to make 
(hence the distinction between ‘mission capable’ and ‘fully mission capable’ systems). 
And finally readiness itself, after all, is only a surrogate for the organizational objectives 
of the DoD (i.e., ready for what?).  Note that if Ao were really the objective, it could be 
maximized by parking equipment.  Hence, logistic performance of weapon systems is 
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more difficult to measure than commercial logistics (at least in terms of productivity), 
and perhaps more attenuated from DoD objectives than are commercial logistic 
measurement systems.  









How do these measurement issues inform the decision to bring forward a 
weapon system or component as a PBL Candidate?  First, again considering only 
outsourced PBL solutions, we must consider the economic logic behind outsourcing.  
One basic economic justification of outsourcing is the tradeoff of economies of scale 
with a reduction in transaction costs.  If the outsourced service can be performed by an 
organization that offers similar services to a number of other customers, that 
organization gains economies of scale, and should be able to offer the service more 
cheaply than if it were done by the outsourcing organization in house.  The price that is 
usually paid for such outsourced services is usually in terms of increased transaction 
costs to negotiate price and services, and monitor performance (Gustafson, Aubert, 
Rivard & Patry, 1996). When economies of scale are difficult to obtain, as with a unique 
weapon system requirement, some of the underlying justification for outsourcing 
disappears.  On the other hand, high internal transaction costs, due to e.g., high 
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reporting requirements, or inefficient internal controls make outsourcing relatively more 
attractive.  If high internal transaction costs are part of the justification for outsourcing a 
PBL contract, then it is important that the system or component being outsourced avoid 
some of those transaction costs.  When measurement of logistic outcomes (readiness, 
agility and cost) is more difficult, it will mean higher transaction costs, because 
performance monitoring systems will have to be more elaborate, and fair prices will be 
more difficult to determine and negotiate. 
One way to make pricing and performance monitoring easier is by reference to a 
market for similar services.  Hence, in prescribing a methodology for the analysis of 
performance based contracts for contract managers, market research is indicated as a 
required step (OSD-DAR, 2000).  For comprehensive weapon system logistical support, 
or for weapon system-unique components, there will likely be no ready market for 
maintenance, or many other logistical support functions.  In those cases, the 
implementation of an outsourced PBL solution will require more cost and effort to 
develop appropriate metrics, and negotiate appropriate prices.   
In summary, measurement issues are endemic to the relationship between 
commercial sector vendors and the DoD.  From the point of view of measurement, the 
best PBL candidates are those with external markets for services, and clear outcomes 
that are easy to relate to mission objectives.  This is not to place a definite boundary on 
the systems where PBL ought to be applied, but only to point out that measurement 
issues may make some PBL implementations far more difficult and expensive, and may 
affect the form of the PBL solution. 
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Measurement, the PBL support spectrum and the 
management of ongoing contracts 
One of the characteristics of PBL is that general characterizations are hard to 
make.  The top level guidance for the initiative always has caveats such as  
“there is no one-size-fits-all approach to PBL. Several programs have started the 
move to PBL under initiatives designed to meet the programs’ specific 
requirements. Each program has tailored the PBL application to its unique 
circumstances taking into account cost, schedule, or product integrity to meet 
warfighter capability. (DoD, 2001, p. 2-2)” 
In reviewing implementations, a wide variety of approaches can be found, in 
terms of measurement and incentives, and in terms of the level at which the PBL 
contract is written:  from a complete weapon system as with the DDG-51, to component 
level stock support, as with the AEGIS.  The spectrum of choices is usually described in 
terms of the degree of commercial support involved, and a frequently encountered 
graphic (which we have been unable to track to its original source) is shown in Figure 2. 






While examples of systems are often given in association with this chart, and 
definitions of the various anchor points (e.g., Mini-Stock Point) are offered, very little 
guidance can be found for the program manager as to what characteristics of a weapon 
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 12- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
system should inform the choice of the degree of commercial involvement, and whether 
the contract should be offered at the system, or component level.  It is our position that 
measurement issues should inform this choice. 
A primary aspect of measurement informing the choice of commercial 
involvement, which we have not discussed yet, is risk.  As should be clear by reference 
to Figure 1, vendors will be primarily interested in reductions of financial risk, while the 
DoD is entirely concerned with operational risk.  The tradeoff of these two kinds of risk 
is central to the logic of PBL outsourcing.  Contracts are almost always offered across 
multiple years (lowering financial risk for the vendor), with the expectation that the 
vendor will assume some degree of operational risk.  Figure 3 shows the expected 
tradeoff of operational risk.   
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Although risk is clearly indicated as a factor to consider when developing a PBL 
strategy (ASN-RDA, 2003; Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense – 
Logistics & Material Readiness [OSD-LMR], Undated), this factor is rarely mentioned as 
a candidate for measures of ongoing performance in PBL contracts.  Indeed, it has 
been said that  
“minimal contract management involvement is anticipated as long as the 
contractor meets contractually specified performance metrics. However our 
involvement may increase if the contractor systems and processes are not 
functioning correctly and end users are not appropriately supported (DoD-DCMA, 
undated, pp 28-29.)” 
This is a curious form of risk transfer.  Operational risk, as we understand it, 
involves the variance associated with outcomes.  The assumption of operational risk by 
a contractor then would entail accountability for control of that variance, and assurance 
(with appropriate remedy in the case of failure) of the mitigation of its impact.  Here, 
rather, it seems that vendors are being asked to assume some aspects of risk (not 
clearly defined), but that the DoD will ‘increase involvement if the contractor’ fails to 
meet requirements.  We do not claim that this is risk transfer in name only, but that the 
form of risk being assumed by vendors is not what is commonly understood as 
operational risk, and the degree of risk they are assuming is apparently quite limited. 
It is our view that the degree of operational risk a contractor can assume is 
limited in many cases by the nature of military operations.  It is unrealistic, for example, 
to assume that contractors will be able to perform operational level maintenance on a 
ground combat weapon system; difficult issues relating to the physical risk, insurance, 
and liability of non-DoD personnel in or near combat need to be addressed.  These 
sorts of operational risk are difficult to measure, and even more difficult to value.  We 
think it likely therefore, that commercial sector vendors will be reluctant to undertake 
these risks.  Depot level maintenance, and operation of CONUS inventory control points 
involve less operational risk, and risk in a form that is easier to measure, and less costly 
for a vendor to assume, and hence we think it likely that the more operational risk 
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involved in the logistical support of a particular system, the more organic resources will 
need to be involved. 
Proposition 1.  When operational risk is high or difficult to measure, PBL 
strategies should seek less commercial sector involvement.  
Within the context of a price negotiation, it is also key to understand the benefit 
the DoD provides by eliminating financial risk, as this is part of what we are paying to 
potential vendors.  Especially if interest rates and rise and the difference between the 
cost of capital and risk-free rates increase, what the DoD offers in terms of financial risk 
mitigation is highly valuable.  This valuable benefit is not free for the government to 
offer, and should be incorporated into pricing and contract negotiations.  If less 
operational risk is assumed by the vendor (or if that risk is difficult to assess), less 
financial risk should be mitigated – meaning contract terms should be reduced. 
Proposition 2.  When commercial sector vendors assume less (measurable) 
operational risk under a PBL contract, the term of that contract should be less. 
On the other hand, the outcomes of PBL strategies involving only certain 
components, or only depot-level support, are more difficult to tie to weapon system 
outcomes.  Consider Figure 4, which shows a highly stylized and simplified version of a 
weapon system and its major components, along with the failure rates (mean time to 
failure) of each of the components.  Assuming failure of any of the components cause 
the weapon system to become non-mission capable, the failure rate of the overall 
weapon system is then an order statistic, formed of the distributions of the time to failure 
of all of the components.  Now consider the problem faced by a program manager who 
has decided that his best PBL strategy involves outsourcing only component A (the one 
with the highest failure rate).  To properly value the impact of, for example a proposed 
incentive to improve the reliability of component A by 10%, the program manager would 
need not only distributional information about the time to fail of all the other 
components, but also a working model which imbeds that system in mission 
requirements.  After all, the final value of an improvement in reliability of a component 
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(to readiness – of course there are other benefits in terms of reduced life-cycle cost of 
spares, and improved agility through reduced footprint)  rests in the increased likelihood 
of mission success in the deployed weapon system.  The sort of integrated simulation 
model needed to properly assess the impact of improved component reliability would be 
expensive, and more importantly, time consuming to build.  Given the time pressures 
put upon Program Managers, it is easy to see that the situation is problematic.   
Proposition 3.  PBL strategies involving less than comprehensive logistical 
support of a weapon system (e.g., for a component) should nonetheless have 
integrated weapons system models in support of their business case analysis.   
In summary, measurement issues exist across the PBL spectrum, but present 
different sorts of challenges at either end.  Ultimately there are at least two core 
measurement issues that should be referred to when deciding on an appropriate level of 
support within the PBL spectrum.  The first is the valuation of outcome-related 
performance, and the second is valuation of operational and financial risk. While 
outcomes are easier to measure at the right end of the spectrum, one is less likely to 
find a relevant market to support price and value decisions.  On the left hand of the 
spectrum, markets may well exist that essentially duplicate, for example, the services of 
a mini-stock point.  However, the valuation of those isolated services in terms of 
weapon systems performance is even more difficult. 
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Aside from risk, another distinction important to develop when discussing 
management of ongoing PBL contracts is the difference between process and outcome 
measures.  It is our position that, while PBL is clearly intended to buy outcomes, and 
relieve management of the necessity of monitoring the details of ‘how’ performance is 
obtained, a great deal of effort is still being devoted to process measurement.  It has 
recently been said that ‘too many metrics’ is a major problem with PBL implementation 
(Office of the Secretary of Defense, Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology & 
Logistics [OSD-ATL], 2004).  If the DoD is buying outcomes, not process, then it may be 
that much of the process measurement is unnecessary. 
An example of ‘too many metrics’ is shown in Figure 5.  This is a slide shown in a 
brief to a base commander to provide an overview of the PBL contracts at his base.  
This is a small base, with only a handful of PBL contracts.    Clearly, the commander 
understands that there are too many metrics, and is tracking them quarterly in order to 
push for their reduction.  Here, the number of metrics itself has become a metric, with 
visibility to the top operating officer at a command.  
Figure 5.  A measure of PBL measures used at one DoD command. 
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Exactly how the superabundance of metrics arises is an open question.  PBL is a 
process meant to streamline management concern with the details of a logistical 
process.  In part, it may arise from a broader context within DoD, of understanding the 
systemic relationships of which logistics is only a part.  Under various titles, including 
Integrated Logistics Support, the last several years has seen an increasing awareness 
of the embedded nature of logistical support, and the inter-relationships involved 
between e.g., manpower, maintenance, and supply.  Figure 6 is taken from a 
presentation to a PBL ‘tiger team’ concerned with establishing metrics.  Figure 6a lists 
the ‘balanced scorecard’ of top level factors for weapon system support.   
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Figure 6b, translates the scorecard into logistics measures, by mapping between 
the high level scorecard factors, and the primary factors (process elements) of another 
management fashion called Integrated Logistical Support (ILS).  The details of ILS 
process elements are not germane here, only to note that they are indeed detailed and 
process oriented.  If one starts with a multidimensional balanced scorecard, and works 
through these process elements, it is easy to see how the number of metrics that must 
be tracked could be numbered in the hundreds – in fact, it would be hard to avoid.  One 
must ask why however, if we are engaged in an initiative to buy performance, we are 
starting with a detailed map of the internals of the process.  Wouldn’t it make more 
sense to measure only key outcomes, and measure them well? 
When we first presented this idea at a conference, we were met with the 
objection that an abundance of measures do not necessarily distract a decision maker 
from key tasks.  The analogy was drawn to a pilot in a jet, where the cockpit has a 
superabundance of meters and instruments, almost all of which can be ignored, except 
in the case of an emergency.  The analogy is a telling one, in that most of the people 
making decisions about metrics for PBL have themselves been pilots, or ship captains, 
or in charge of some complex process in the past.  However, PBL is not supposed to 
present the DoD with a complex process to manage – it is supposed to take one off the 
hands of the DoD.  We aren’t supposed to be flying the plane – we are supposed to be 
passengers.  When you are paying someone else to get you to your destination, you 
care about the price of the ticket, and arriving on time.   
Of course this is a simplification.  When discussing a PBL contract with one 
deployed squadron, we were met with a complaint about the difficulty of obtaining 
requisition status for parts that were backordered.  The maintenance officer for that 
squadron was not impressed that the average lead time to get the parts had been 
reduced, because his primary decision when confronted with a backorder was whether 
or not to devote the manpower to strip a spare part from another downed aircraft.  It was 
a decision that was difficult to make, without knowing how long it would be before the 
spare part arrived.  Clearly, in this case, some visibility into the process was needed, 
but only because a key operational decision rested on the measurement of that 
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process.  Given that at least part of the justification for PBL is meant to be a reduction in 
transaction costs, we think this should probably be a general rule. 
Proposition 4.  In the management of ongoing PBL contracts, metrics should 
primarily concern themselves with valued outcomes, and should be related to 
weapon system cost, readiness, and agility.  Process measures should only be 
applied when key operating decisions depend on the status of the process itself. 
Figure 6b.  Metric Areas informed by Balanced Scorecard, and ILS Process Elements.  










Finally, we turn to the measurement of risk in ongoing PBL contracts. Operational 
risk is always difficult to assess.  In the context of support for a weapon system, it can 
be understood as variance in the logistics-related readiness of that system.  A common 
measure of readiness is Ao.  To see how variability, or risk, affects Ao, consider Table 
2.  The table shows the availability of two squadrons of 10 aircraft over a 20 day period.  
Over that period, both squadrons would report operational availability of 95%.  But 
consider that a mission requiring 10 aircraft would be degraded (more likely to fail) only 
5% of the time in the first case, but 50% of the time in the second case.  The difference 
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is the variance in Ao.  To our knowledge, in spite of the exhortations of the centrality of 
risk assumption and readiness to PBL, there are no programs currently tracking this 
measure. 
Table 2.  Distributional differences in a 95% Ao. 
Day FMC aircraft 
In  Squadron A 
(10 aircraft total) 
FMC aircraft 
In Squadron B 
(10 aircraft total) 
1 10 10 
2 10 09 
3 10 10 
4 10 09 
5 10 10 
6 10 09 
7 10 10 
8 10 09 
9 10 10 
10 10 09 
11 10 10 
12 10 09 
13 10 10 
14 10 09 
15 10 10 
16 10 09 
17 10 10 
18 10 09 
19 10 10 
20 0 09 
 
In a very thoughtful document, the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN-RDA, 2003) listed factors to consider 
when deciding whether to use a PBL strategy: life-cycle stage, acquisition program 
strategy (including programmatic risks), organic impact (e.g., maintaining engineering 
expertise), commercial base (including additional risk required of industry partners), 
design considerations (including risk associated with incentives and performance 
thresholds), and technology considerations (including supportability risks).  Although 
risk is mentioned in four of the six factors, there is no mention of the sort of operational 
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risk discussed above, and shown in Figure 3.  Indeed, there is little mention of risk for 
ongoing contracts in this, or any other guidance documents for PBL.  We find this 
curious.  If part of what we are buying is operational risk mitigation (in key performance 
dimensions), it seems to us that it ought to be measured. 
Propositions 5.  Operational risk (variability) in key performance measures should 
be tracked for ongoing PBL contracts.  Where essential to mission support, a 
reduction in variability should be supported with appropriate incentives. 
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Conclusion 
Organic acquisition and sustaining logistics in the Department of Defense of 
today is seriously challenged in its ability to provide significantly higher levels of 
operational availability and effectiveness commensurate with the complexity and high 
costs of weapon systems.  In addition we exacerbate the pressure on logistics support 
as we prosecute our national security strategies with ships, airplanes, and equipment 
that are aging when a sufficient replenishment rate to counter that aging is unaffordable.  
Any change in the Defense Department Logistics discipline that can produce greater 
utility at lower costs should be the focus of an energetic pursuit.  In order to bring about 
the necessary improvements we must mitigate cultural impediments and concurrently 
align measurement and rewards with good logistics performance in the acquisition 
process and operation of weapons systems in the field.  It is also important to fully fund 
logistics requirements, safeguard the funding and engage in long-term contracts. 
The Department of Defense faces major challenges in establishing a coherent 
logistics support strategy for its weapon systems.  While Performance-Based Logistics 
has been decreed as a preferred implementation strategy, real questions remain 
unanswered about objectives and measurability.  The disaggregation of logistics 
support, and the emphasis on an increased role for the private sector in logistics, also 
raise major issues related to the assumption of risk.  In making sourcing decisions, DoD 
must act as a “knowledgeable client” and avoid simplistic decisions that may lead to 
critical systems being left unsupported. 
In summary, this paper has presented a framework, and propositions about the 
impact of measurement on PBL.  None of the propositions have the status of fully 
supported hypotheses, or fully developed theorems. All need further investigation.  
Some of the propositions are empirical, and need to be investigated in the field.  Others 
are prescriptive, and need to be supported by modeling and analysis.  Our hope is that 
we have furthered the discussion of metrics for PBL, and added to the momentum for 
improved implementations of PBL. 
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